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ARTICLES
INVESTOR EDUCATION, SECURITIES
DISCLOSURE, AND THE CREATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND FIRM NORMS
James A. Fanto*
I. INTRODUCTION
All signs suggest that investor education for ordinary investors will be-
come closely related to securities disclosure. Because many Americans
now have to decide how to invest their savings for retirement, their well-
being in retirement greatly depends upon their optimal saving and in-
vestment decision making.! Because they lack confidence in federal and
state government provisions for retirement and other social benefits,
they understand their need to save and invest in outside retirement plans
for such goals as their children's education.2 Even the nearly one-half of
* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank Gary Minda, Eric
Orts, Tony Sebok, Larry Solan, and especially, Margaret Blair, Eric Chiappinelli, John
Fedders, Donald Langevoort, David Lipton, Marleen O'Connor, Beth-Ann Roth, Mark
Sargent, Russell Stevenson, and other participants in the symposium on Corporate Disclo-
sure and Corporate Morality/Efficiency at The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law, for their useful comments. I would also like to thank Dean Joan Wexler of
Brooklyn Law School for a summer research grant that allowed me to complete this arti-
cle.
1. See James A. Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provi-
sion and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998)
(manuscript at 11-21, on file with the Catholic University Law Review) (companion paper
discussing the pressures of investing and saving for retirement). To take only one exam-
ple, many retirement "pension" programs are "defined contribution" plans where an em-
ployer establishes an individual account for an employee, to which the employer and em-
ployee may make contributions, and where an employee specifies how the funds are to be
invested within the limited number of options provided by the plan. See id. at 15-18; see
also EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PROGRAMS 57-59, 70-72 (5th ed. 1997) (elaborating on the aspects of a defined
contribution plan); see generally Deborah M. Weiss & Marc A. Sgaraglino, Prudent Risks
for Anxious Workers, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (describing enhanced investing re-
sponsibility placed on ordinary investors).
2. See STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST
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working Americans who have no pension eligibility and little ability to
save from income3 someday may have limited investment decision mak-
ing in individualized Social Security accounts.4 Furthermore, the tradi-
tional focus of securities disclosure, which requires companies offering
securities to provide information to investors, is inadequate for their
needs. Therefore, ordinary people now having saving and investing re-
sponsibilities must be educated to understand disclosure so as to invest
competently
Although inevitable and necessary, investor education raises many
questions: What kind of education do investors need, particularly if we
assume that markets are efficient?6 How does one educate investors to
resist their own psychological limitations that can distort optimal invest-
ment decision making?' What education is appropriate when people in-
HUNDRED YEARS 250 (1997) (addressing financial concerns, other than retirement, that
many Americans face).
3. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-81, RETIREMENT
INCOME: IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND
PENSION REFORM 43 (1997) (observing that only 45-47% of employees in the private sec-
tor are covered by pensions, a number that has remained constant since 1970).
4. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON RETIREMENT POLICY, "THE 21ST CENTURY
RETIREMENT SECURITY PLAN" 1 (1998) (recommending establishment of "a mechanism
to create individual savings accounts within Social Security that minimizes administrative
costs and provides individuals with control over the investment of a portion of their Fed-
eral Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes, without exposing individuals to significant
new risk"); Elizabeth A. White, Kasich Bill Would Use Surpluses For Personal Retirement
Accounts, PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 13, 1998), available in LEXIS, Labor Li-
brary, BNAPEN File (discussing legislative proposals to use budget surpluses to establish
individualized retirement accounts for all Americans); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/HEHS-98-33, SOCIAL SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING
PROGRAM SOLVENCY 32-70 (1998) (discussing various proposals regarding Social Secu-
rity, including establishing individual retirement accounts).
5. See Fanto, supra note 1 (manuscript at 85-90) (evaluating SEC investor education
programs); see also Arthur Levitt, Remarks before the Investment Company Institute 2
(May 15, 1998) (transcript available at <http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch212.txt>)
(challenging securities industry leaders to "[a]sk [themselves] whether [they] have done
enough to educate investors about how to safeguard their financial future").
6. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554-57 (1984) (describing the concept of "market efficiency"
and fully informed market participants).
7. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 858-61 (1992) (analyzing the pys-
chological effects on the economic behavior of investors and rational decision-making). In
addition, Professor Langevoort has studied the legal implications of psychological litera-
ture suggesting that investors act irrationally. See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope,
Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and
Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 635-41 (1996). For a discussion of common
behavioral problems affecting rational decision making, see generally Christine Jolls et al.,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-89 (1998);
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vest through brokers and mutual funds? Who should conduct the educa-
tion? In a companion paper, I attempt to answer some of these questions
by proposing a theoretical framework for investor education that identi-
fies three basic kinds of investor education: training on how to save (i.e.,
to defer consumption), how to invest well (i.e., to use basic asset-
allocation strategies and life-cycle investing), and how to avoid common
forms of investment fraud.8 I then evaluate several recent initiatives of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that both demonstrate
its recognition of an investor's need for more than securities disclosure
and are designed to contribute to investor education.9
Not surprisingly, this examination does not consider how investor edu-
cation might affect corporate morality. First, the acquisition of critical
basic saving and investing skills by ordinary people takes priority over
any other form of investor education because an individual's very sur-
vival depends upon such training. Furthermore, Americans have the re-
sponsibility to save and to invest optimally, and thus, it is necessary to
improve their saving and investing performance through education as
soon as possible. Second, what I call "morality education" is different in
nature from basic investor education. Morality education broadens an
investor's perspective beyond the finance-based focus on an optimal in-
dividual portfolio that characterizes saving and investing education, to an
understanding of the nature and purposes of firms and their governance.
Basic investor education aims to change an ordinary person's behavior so
that he or she will save and invest well (and avoid investment fraud). On
the other hand, morality education potentially leads an investor to try to
affect firm behavior in ways that might or might not contribute to his or
her own finance-based goals. °
The central difficulties of morality education are: (1) identifying what
it is that this "corporate morality" investor education should help estab-
lish; and (2) understanding the causation chain linking investor educa-
tion, the investor, and securities disclosure to corporate morality. Part II
Cass R. Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997).
8. See Fanto, supra note 1 (manuscript at 34-85). The companion paper also ana-
lyzes the growing number of investor education efforts by government agencies and pri-
vate parties. See id at 69-85.
9. See id. at 85-122 (discussing the SEC's Office of Investor Education and Assis-
tance, its "plain English" initiative, and its recent efforts to simplify mutual fund disclo-
sure).
10. The classic way of penalizing a firm in the capital markets is to sell its shares,
which lowers its stock price and requires firms to pay higher costs or rates to raise capital
in the future. Cf. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 6 (1991). An investor does not have to exercise this
discipline on firms for purely financial reasons.
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
of this Article examines corporate morality as behavioral "norms" of
firms and firm management and discusses the ways in which morality
education can make investors aware of these norms and the means to en-
force them. It draws support from recent, extensive legal and economic
literature on the creation of social "norms."11 Part II further observes
that, although it is difficult to know with absolute confidence what corpo-
rate norms should be, there is agreement on certain desirable norms, in-
cluding corporate governance norms of appropriate behavior for execu-
tives and directors. Finally, Part II studies how the causation chain,
which connects investor education to norm creation and enforcement,
functions and why educating an ordinary investor to understand securi-
ties disclosure is a key link in this chain.
Part III finds that current government and private investor education
efforts and materials do not include morality education. Even federal fi-
nancial market regulators like the SEC, who produce their own educa-
tional materials and who have a "public interest" perspective on educa-
tion, have not developed morality education nor recognized the link
between investor education and corporate morality. This is not surpris-
ing. Because investor education is relatively new and because many or-
dinary investors do not know how to save and invest, public and private
educational efforts are focusing almost single-mindedly on basic saving,
investing, and anti-fraud education. In the near term, the absence of mo-
rality education has not adversely affected firm behavior, because exist-
ing issue-oriented groups monitor firms, influence public opinion by
calling attention to corporate misbehavior, and, thus, address egregious
cases of corporate immorality. In addition, activist institutional investors
and the proxy firms assisting them have transformed corporate govern-
ance norms without much help from ordinary investors. Yet, if investor
education continues to focus an individual investor only on his or her
saving and portfolio performance, it will undermine the potential influ-
ence of such investors in firms, and prevent them from seeing themselves
11. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 343-50 (1997) (citing and discussing the voluminous legal and eco-
nomic literature on norms). For representative recent works on this subject, see generally
David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relationships,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 (1996); Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Genera-
tive Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997); Eric A. Posner,
The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective
Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An
Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and
Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
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as more than self-interested persons who focus all of their investing at-
tention on financial gain.12
Part IV argues that investor education should, therefore, proceed
eventually beyond basic finance to morality education and train ordinary
investors to understand and discuss the following: the nature and pur-
poses of business firms; the appropriate norms of firm and firm agent be-
havior, particularly corporate governance norms; sources of information
about norm compliance; and the available means to influence firms if in-
vestors decide to try to have an impact upon corporate morality. This
kind of education fulfills the basic goal of all investor education: to make
people responsible investors. "Responsibility" here simply means that
investors should be taught to own and manage their investment property
in accordance with "generally accepted investing standards" and with
their own preferences, which includes their individual, moral, political,
and social preferences. 3 Part IV offers several normative and pragmatic
justifications for morality education. For normative support, it draws
upon a political vision that politically active citizens should be similarly
active in the management of their property, and upon a philosophical
approach which suggests that, where possible, individuals should not be
constrained into limited roles and should be trained to see many possi-
bilities of reflection and action. The pragmatic justification contends
that, since investing is now part of ordinary life and technology enhances
individuals' control of their investment assets, there may be adverse con-
sequences for corporate morality if large numbers of investors are never
instructed about firm normative issues. It also argues that institutional
investors-who, after all, are trustees for individual shareholders-can
profitably join forces with individual investors to promote corporate and
corporate agent morality. The Part concludes by discussing briefly the
possible content and providers of morality education and by observing
that such education could be part of a high school economics or business
12. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1030 (1996). Professor Greenwood
argues that
[s]hareholders are treated as if their entire identity were their shareownership, as
if their sole goal in life were to maximize the risk-adjusted present value of the
future income stream represented by those shares and as if they had no compet-
ing interests that might, even occasionally, warrant taking an action not designed
to improve "shareholder" value.
Id. (footnote omitted).
13. "Preferences" is a term of art in the economic and psychological literature. See
Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1176 (noting that "preferences and values are sometimes con-
structed rather than elicited by social situations") (footnote omitted). I shall not deal with
the issue of the production of preferences.
1998]
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course.
II. INVESTOR EDUCATION AND CORPORATE MORALITY
The link between investor education and corporate morality involves
several critical steps. The first and most difficult step is the identification
of the corporate morality to be established or reinforced. To train inves-
tors to understand disclosure about corporate morality, educators must
agree on the morality that is the subject of the disclosure and education.
Selecting a morality to be taught has significant individual and social
consequences. Not only does the selection establish the proper kinds of
firm behavior, but the morality will be used to instruct ordinary people to
view business firms from a particular perspective, which is influential if,
as is often the case, they have little pre-existing understanding of appro-
priate firm behavior. Like any educational goal, corporate morality pro-
duces, and reproduces, a particular kind of society.
In this Article, I assume that corporate morality is social or cultural: in
our culture, those operating corporations or other firms conduct their
business in accordance with certain social "norms" and those owning
firms expect compliance with them. 14 This characterization does not sim-
plify matters, however, for the social acceptance (one might even say
dominance) of certain firm norms rather than others is itself subject to
political and social struggles and debates. Some want a corporation and
its agents to pursue only shareholder profit.15 Others see them as serving
"other constituencies" and stakeholders as well.16 In the economic litera-
ture, the most successful norm analysis has involved identifying enduring
norms in small cohesive groups (e.g., cattle ranchers, jewelers, ethnic
lending groups) with clearly defined, easily specifiable purposes."
14. See McAdams, supra note 11, at 351 (defining norms as "informal, decentralized
obligations"); R. Posner, supra note 11, at 365 ("By 'social norm' ('norm' for short) I shall
mean a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or a legisla-
ture, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions, yet is regularly complied with (other-
wise, it wouldn't be a rule).") (footnote omitted).
15. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Govern-
ance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 738 (1997) ("Our perspective on corporate governance is a straight-
forward agency perspective, sometimes referred to as separation of ownership and control.
We want to know how investors get the managers to give them back their money.").
16. See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 274 (1995) ("Far from
abandoning the idea that firms should be run for all the stakeholders, contractual ar-
rangements and governance systems should be devised to assign control rights, rewards,
and responsibilities to the appropriate stakeholders-the parties that contribute special-
ized inputs.").
17. See Cooter, supra note 11, at 950-51 (discussing norm formation in small groups);
[Vol. 48:15
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Agreeing upon the appropriate norms to be applied to businesses, their
operators, and their owners in the large and diverse society of the United
States presents a significant challenge and has more far-reaching social
consequences than the specification of norms in the small groups favored
as subjects of study by law and economics scholars) 8
This Article cannot pretend to identify, as a normative matter, which
corporate and firm agent norms education should espouse.' 9 However, as
an anecdotal empirical matter, there appears to exist in our culture some
generally agreed upon norms relating to firm and firm agent behavior.0
For example, business people understand that bribery of government of-
ficials is forbidden behavior, as is excessive firm interference with the
political system, although the line between such interference and lobby-
ing is not always clear. In many instances, law reinforces these norms.
Accepted corporate norms include those dealing with corporate govern-
ance that specify proper attitudes and behavior of corporate fiduciaries
and thus apply primarily to high-level managers and members of boards
of directors. Corporate governance norms reflect the basic fiduciary ob-
ligations that require corporate employees not to act just for themselves
when directing or operating a corporate enterprise, but for others and for
specific purposes relating to the enterprise. Who and what these "oth
E. Posner, supra note 11, at 165-76 (discussing ethnic-based group norms); R. Posner, su-
pra note 11, at 366 (making a point about the usefulness of norm analysis in small groups).
18. See Charny, supra note 11, at 1847 (questioning how well the "norm" approach
works outside the small group setting, particularly with respect to commercial relations in
mass markets).
19. I suggest in Part IV that education should instruct investors concerning the de-
bates over corporate norms.
20. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine culture--or language, for that matter--ex-
isting without shared understandings regarding behavior. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 89 (1973) ("[Culture] denotes
an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetu-
ate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.").
21. The interrelation of business and politics is admittedly complex. Cf FRED S.
MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
POLITICAL EXTORTION 41 (1997) (suggesting that politicians, in effect, solicit "bribes" or
"rents" from private firms in order not to extract profits from such firms by legislation and
regulation).
22. See E. Posner, supra note 11, at 165-93 (discussing positive and negative effects of
laws upon norms); R. Posner, supra note 11, at 367-68 (discussing interaction between law
and norms).
23. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 179-217 (1997) (describing basic legal
obligations of management); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 60
(1996) (observing that informal norms may ensure that managers act on behalf of share-
holders); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 149 (6th ed. 1996) (describing the duty of
1998]
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ers" and "purposes" are opens the debate about the content of the
norms, although such content may be less of an issue in the reality of firm
life where managers generally try to make money for their shareholders
while also serving other constituencies.24
The next link in the chain between corporate morality and investor
education is securities disclosure; disclosure should reveal whether cor-
porations and corporate agents are complying with accepted "norms."
Under U.S. securities regulations, a corporation assisted by independent
professionals, such as bankers, accountants, and lawyers, whose legal and
reputational concerns help ensure the accuracy of the disclosure,25 in ef-
fect conducts self-disclosure primarily about its business operations and
financial results, which may also reveal its compliance (or lack of compli-
ance) with norms.26
However, the capacity of mandatory disclosure under securities regula-
tions to identify norm compliance, or even to deal at all with corporate
morality, should not be exaggerated. This disclosure does not cover what
many would identify as normative issues. This is so because information
pertaining to a company's compliance with a norm might not be dis-
closed if it is not required by a line item or if it does not trigger the mate-
riality threshold in such an item. For example, a company has no obli-
care as an "aspirational statement").
24. See MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE
CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 36-37 (1996) (observing that institu-
tional investors have changed shareholder-management relations so that managers must
remain in constant contact with their shareholders); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
A Theory of Corporation Law as a Response to Contracting Problems in Team Production,
84 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1999) (observing situations where, in law and reality,
corporate management serves multiple constituencies).
25. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Mod-
ern Securities Regulation, 52 BuS. LAW. 1195, 1210-13, 1232-33 (1997) (discussing the
"gatekeeper" role of lawyers and investment bankers in securities offerings, that is, to en-
sure the reliability of the company whose securities are being sold).
26. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
240-45 (1997) (presenting overview of this self-disclosure under the securities laws).
27. As a brief summary, in any registered securities offering a company selling its se-
curities must file a registration statement, on which the offering document or prospectus is
based. A company filing a registration statement must provide detailed disclosure in ac-
cordance with a list of items in forms keyed to certain kinds of offerings and companies.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101-.802 (1997) (providing a description of these items commonly re-
ferred to as Regulation S-K). Similarly, if a company is a reporting company (i.e., it has
listed its securities on an exchange or has a large number of U.S. shareholders), it must file
annual and quarterly reports in accordance with SEC form requirements. See 15 U.S.C. §
78m (1994). An item becomes subject to mandatory disclosure only through a political
process that may or may not reflect general social acceptance of its importance. Cf ANNE
M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF
EXPERTISE 83-118 (1992) (presenting an overview of the "politics" of SEC rule making).
[Vol. 48:15
Investor Education
gation to discuss its treatment of employees or their working conditions;
disclosure about employees is generally limited to the number employed
and collective bargaining agreements in force." Still, disclosure may
touch on normative matters, particularly in corporate governance. For
instance, standard disclosure items require discussion of management's
background, compensation, and its transactions and business relation-
ships with the firm, all of which could reveal a lack of compliance with
accepted norms of management behavior. 9 Shareholders, moreover, can
encourage companies to disclose information about their compliance
with certain norms, even if mandatory disclosure would not otherwise
require them to address the subject.
If one assumes that mandatory disclosure identifies norm compliance
or violation, it can lead to norm creation or enforcement and, in effect,
"morality creation," in a manner different from, but not exclusive of, law
enforcement. Admittedly, this is just a "norm" recharacterization of the
traditional justification for SEC mandatory disclosure, which states that
disclosure discourages company misbehavior by bringing it to the "light
of day."31 Norm creation and enforcement is generally understood to
emerge through the collective enforcement of individuals who share the
norms in question-that is, members of the "norm community." The
collective action often takes the form of "soft" sanctions that still carry
considerable force; norm followers "shun" or "shame" norm violators,
with the ultimate sanction being a collective refusal to deal with the vio-
lator. As norm theorists explain, a central problem of norm creation and
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xiii) (requiring disclosure of "[tihe number of persons
employed by the registrant"); see also Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial
Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 581-82
(1997) (pointing out that corporations do not have to disclose charitable contributions
they have made).
29. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401-.404.
30. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
34-40018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106 (1998) (amending 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997)) (establish-
ing a rule pursuant to which shareholders can put a proposal on a company's annual proxy
statement); Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
34-39093, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682 (1997) (proposed Sept. 26, 1997) (proposing changes to such
rule). In fact, some of the most controversial Rule 14a-8 proposals have involved efforts
by shareholders to place on a company's proxy statement proposals attempting to effect
"norm" changes in companies. See id. at 50,683 ("Social policy issues, such as environ-
mental matters or the manufacture of tobacco products, and other issues, such as extraor-
dinary business transactions, are also the focus of a significant number of proposals each
year.").
31. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND How THE BANKERS
USE IT 92 (1914): Louis D. Brandeis, who provided this traditional justification for man-
datory disclosure, was a source of inspiration for much New Deal legislation.
1998]
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enforcement in large groups is publicity; dispersed individuals may have
difficulty even realizing that they share norms or that a particular person
has violated them.32
In the large social world of American business and investment, manda-
tory disclosure of norms and their violations can provide the necessary
publicity to help create and enforce business norms. Disclosure not only
alerts individuals that others consider the norms to be important-that
there is, in fact, a norm community larger than they thought33 -but, more
importantly, it also notifies them about "rogue" corporations and/or cor-
porate actors. Investors can thus "sanction" a company appropriately: by
discounting its shares, by voting directors out of office, or by "shunning"
the firm through other action, such as product boycotts. The publication
of norm violations in a company may even make employees not impli-
cated in the violations ashamed of working for that company and may
encourage them to look elsewhere for employment.34
For example, if it becomes "socially" unacceptable for a company to
do business in a certain country, disclosure can enforce this norm by re-
vealing the identity of a company conducting business there, which can
result in consequent adverse publicity for the company and boycotts of
company products. Disclosure about the background and structure of
board members, management compensation, share holdings, trading by
officers and large stockholders, and dividend policy35 may reveal compli-
ance, or noncompliance, with corporate governance norms;36 and such
32. See McAdams, supra note 11, at 362-64 (discussing the importance of publicity in
establishing a norm consensus as well as in detecting norm violations). Individuals sharing
norms suffer from collective action problems. See id. at 362-63. Because they really do
not benefit individually from policing compliance with norms, individual investors will
spend little effort on norm enforcement. Accordingly, for norm enforcement to work, in-
dividuals must collectively enforce norms. Publicity helps create this collective action by
simultaneously identifying the violator and the complying members of the community.
See id. at 363; cf. id. at 366-72 (presuming society-wide knowledge of the consensus, such
that "esteem" will drive individuals to conform to the consensus). Publicity is not difficult
in a small, cohesive group where the members constantly interact with, and thus monitor,
one another, which is why norms work best there.
33. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 929-30 (discussing "norm bandwagons," whereby
new norms are established through individual and group action). See also McAdams, su-
pra note 11, at 400-07 (discussing how law can be used to signal, and thus to establish, a
conseisus around certain norms).
34. Norm enforcement may intersect with law enforcement; securities law disclosure
may reveal behavior that is actionable under state corporate law. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
4(d) (1997) (providing for mandatory disclosure on an issuer self-tender, which requires a
kind of disclosure that shareholders could use to show that a corporation treated them un-
fairly in the transaction).
35. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.201, 229.401-.405 (1997).
36. See, e.g., BLAIR, supra note 16, at 116-21 (summarizing some corporate govern-
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disclosure, as opposed to materially misleading disclosure, does not nec-
essarily trigger any law enforcement.37 For instance, if a sign of a board's
independence from management (e.g., a lead outside director) signals
compliance with these norms, disclosure showing its presence or absence
could further extend, as well as enforce, the norms. Indeed, these exam-
ples suggest why parties actively contest whether a particular subject
should become part of mandatory disclosure; those parties realize that
disclosure has much to do with norm creation and enforcement.38
Norm creation and enforcement thus cannot work, unless disclosure of
pertinent norm information reaches members of the potential norm
community who understand and act upon it. In securities disclosure,
owners of firms have to comprehend the significance of disclosure per-
taining to corporate norms and the importance of acting upon this disclo-
sure. Here, the significance of investor education in the chain leading to
the enforcement of corporate morality becomes apparent, for without
education, investors may well not understand the norm information pro-
vided to them. Education must train ordinary investors that disclosure
documents and other sources (e.g., market information services, newspa-
pers, stock prices) provide information about corporate and corporate
agent behavior. More importantly, it must lead investors to understand
the importance of business and corporate governance norms and to iden-
tify their violation by firms and corporate agents. Investors then need
instruction on the available possibilities of collective action to establish
and enforce such norms.
While some norms and their enforcement do not involve much educa-
tion for the ordinary investor (e.g., people would readily understand and
condemn a corporation's excessive interference with the political proc-
ess), a typical small investor may not understand corporate governance
ance codes of conduct designed by institutional investors); THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE,
STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1997), available at <http://www.brtable.org/
document.cfm/1l> (on file with The Catholic University Law Review) (offering the organi-
zation's guidelines on various corporate governance issues); THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORE PRINCIPLES &
GUIDELINES (Apr. 13, 1998) available at <http://www.calpers.ca.gov> (on file with The
Catholic University Law Review) (establishing guidelines for the nation's largest public
institutional investor).
37. In an extreme, but unlikely, scenario, the disclosure might reveal a breach of a
fiduciary duty of care or loyalty by officers or directors.
38. Interested parties, of course, also debate with regulators about disclosure re-
quirements because they fear the enhanced costs of compliance, as well as other potential
adverse effects, such as liability risks and/or loss of confidentiality. See generally Edmund
W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 763, 840-
74 (1995) (addressing reasons for the limited scope of disclosure requirements under cur-
rent laws).
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norms, their importance in business, or the prevalent means of collective
action to enforce them. For example, a corporation may pay its chief ex-
ecutive a high salary in relation to his performance which does not neces-
sarily violate any corporate law, but which arguably runs against current
governance norms.39 Disclosure helps an investor identify the mismatch
between pay and performance. 4° However, an ordinary investor needs to
be educated not only on how to understand the disclosure, but also on
how to appreciate its significance; that is, that the board may be inactive
and under the chief executive's control, and that it has not adopted the
right incentive structure for the executive.4' Such education may train an
investor on where to find sources to interpret this disclosure, such as
shareholder activists. Education would also have to teach the investor
42
about appropriate responses by the governance norm community,
which could include lending support to a shareholder resolution dealing
with management compensation, sending a letter or e-mail to manage-
ment, or selling one's shares in the company.
Later, I shall return to a brief consideration of the substance of moral-
ity education and related issues, such as whether this education is worth
its costs and whether educated investors could contribute to norm en-
forcement. It is useful now to examine whether such education currently
exists and the immediate consequences of the current state of investor
educational affairs.
III. EXISTING CORPORATE MORALITY AND GOVERNANCE EDUCATION
There has been little investor morality education, which is due partly
to the concentration of educational resources and attention on saving
and investing education. This state of affairs arguably has not adversely
affected corporate morality, because during the new era of "investor
capitalism" in recent years, institutional investors and other "norm en-
39. See BLAIR, supra note 16, at 88-92 (summarizing the executive compensation de-
bate).
40. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(2) (providing requirements of detailed disclosure of
executive compensation).
41. In this example, an investor may base his or her understanding of an executive's
misbehavior on general social norms dealing with "fair" pay and "fair" employee behav-
ior, provided that the investor can decipher the executive compensation disclosure, or
have someone explain it.
42. The acceptable enforcement strategies of corporate governance enforcement can
be understood as social "institutions" (i.e., socially-accepted ways of behaving). See Jack
Knight & Douglass North, Explaining Economic Change: The Interplay Between Cognition
and Institutions, 3 LEGAL THEORY 211, 214 (1997) (explaining that "[i]nstitutions consist
of formal rules (constitutions, statute and common law, regulations), informal rules (con-
ventions and social norms), and enforcement mechanisms").
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trepreneurs"'3 have developed and enforced corporate governance and
other kinds of corporate norms." As a pragmatic matter, there has thus
been little immediate need to educate ordinary investors about corporate
norms.
A review of investor education materials45 shows that they deal rarely
with any norm creation and enforcement, and do not even educate inves-
tors about corporate governance norms. Rather, they focus on the three
basic kinds of investor education: saving, investing, and avoiding invest-
ment fraud.4' The educational materials do not provide any instruction
about appropriate behavior for corporate agents-that is, managers and
directors-or about available procedures enabling investors to affect
norms. For example, an investor should understand the governance
structure of a firm and the possibility of investor "voice" through voting
rights, albeit on a limited number of issues.47 Yet even well-designed in-
vestor education materials do little more than note in passing that some
kinds of investments (e.g., common stock) carry voting rights.48 In teach-
43. See McAdams, supra note 11, at 394-97 (referring to "'norm entrepreneurs' as
those who "aim to shape norms").
44. See USEEM, supra note 24, at 15-37 (discussing "new rules" of "investor capital-
ism" in which management autonomy has declined as investors take a more active role in
governance).
45. See Fanto, supra note 1 (manuscript at 63-65 nn.147-52) (surveying investor edu-
cation materials available from numerous sources, including profit, not-for-profit, and
government agencies).
46. See id. (manuscript at 37-51) (studying the areas of investor education). They are
thus designed to bring ordinary investors into the saving and investing world or "culture."
The materials teach investors how to defer consumption; they instruct individuals about
life-cycle investing and asset-allocation strategies, as well as about financial markets and
financial professionals; and they attempt to alert investors as to the forms of investment
fraud used against consumers. The materials come at different levels of sophistication-
comic books for students versus beta portfolio evaluations for experienced investors-and
in diverse formats, including both written and electronic media. See, e.g., id. (manuscript
at 53 n.119) (discussing Merrill Lynch's comic book for children, THE FURTHER
ADVENTURES OF SAVIN' DAVE AND THE COMPOUNDERS (1997)); id. (manuscript at 67-
68 n.161) (recognizing <http://www.riskview.com>, a web site that permits an investor to
calculate the risk of his portfolio).
47. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 94 (1986) (enumerating lim-
ited number of subjects on which shareholders have a vote). Indeed, courts often assume
that, if an individual purchases a security, he or she is conversant with the rights and limi-
tations that accompany this kind of property. See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 182
A.2d 22, 26 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963) (presuming shareholders know
the possibility under corporate law that a corporation may reorganize in a way that hurts
their economic interest).
48. See, e.g., AMERICAN SAVINGS EDUCATION COUNCIL (visited Aug. 25, 1998)
<http://www.asec.org> (providing no information on this subject); NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, You AND THE INVESTMENT WORLD 4 (1997),
<http://www.nyse.com/public/educate/6a/6al/6alb/6alb.htm> (visited Aug. 26, 1998)
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ing materials of the National Institute for Consumer Education and the
National Association of Securities Dealers, called "The Basics of Invest-
ing," the normative discussion aims only to create and reinforce norms of
ethical investing behavior in students by helping them to understand how
investment fraud harms investment markets and society through loss of
consumer confidence in the securities markets.49
Although the SEC has been active in investor education,' ° it, too, con-
centrates on the three basic forms of investor education. In its educa-
tional materials, the SEC does not portray a "responsible" investor as
one who, in addition to investing optimally, also enforces general busi-
ness or corporate governance norms through his or her saving and in-
vesting practices. This lack of attention to norms is most striking in mu-
tual fund regulation, where the SEC recently has devoted substantial
effort to revising and simplifying fund disclosure, primarily by developing
a "profile" or abbreviated prospectus that fund companies can use to sell
funds to investors." The disclosure has an educational purpose since it is
designed to help focus ordinary investors, with little time and investing
background, on the most important information regarding a fund in-
vestment: Yet the profile all but ignores corporate governance. A pro-
file prospectus would disclose the identity of the investment advisor and
the investment policies of the fund, together with its performance his-
tory, but not information about board members or governance of the
53
company.
(noting simply that common stock gives voting rights on certain matters).
49. See National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. & National Institute for Con-
sumer Education, Ethics and Fraud, in THE BASICS OF INVESTING: A GUIDE FOR
EDUCATORS Unit 6 (1997), available at <http://www.investor.NASD.com/nisection6.html>
(visited Aug. 25, 1998).
50. See Fanto, supra note 9 (manuscript at 85-111) (discussing the SEC's Office of
Investor Education and Assistance, its "plain English" initiative, and its recent efforts to
simplify mutual fund disclosure).
51. See New Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7513, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,968 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 230 & 270) (final rule on profile prospectus); Proposed New Disclosure Option for
Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 33-7399, 62
Fed. Reg. 10,943 (1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230) (proposed Mar. 10, 1997)
(proposal on profile prospectus).
52. See Fanto, supra note 1 (manuscript at 111-22).
53. See New Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment Companies,
63 Fed. Reg. at 13,969 (limiting disclosure to fund goals, strategies, risks, fees, information
on the fund's advisor, purchasing and selling fund shares, fund distributions, and taxation);
Proposed New Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment Companies, 62
Fed. Reg. at 10,945-50 (describing, in greater detail than the final rule, each disclosure
item in the profile). The only recent educational SEC initiative related to norm enforce-
ment is its requirement that companies, fund companies, or others present their proxy
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Although, as discussed below, the absence of morality education is not
acceptable and ordinary investors should do more than specialize in risk
diversification,54 the current state of investor education may be the best
short-run solution. For primarily cultural reasons, education will be im-
portant in helping ordinary Americans deal with their saving and invest-
ing responsibilities.5 It is difficult to educate ordinary people to save
more, to invest optimally in line with the teachings of finance, and to stay
away from the common forms of investment fraud. However, a well-
designed government and private party educational partnership may fur-
ther these educational goals. 6 More Americans are becoming educated
about saving and investing as these activities become a part of everyday
life. Education about firm and governance norms should wait until the
major kinds of investor education take hold.
Additionally, the absence of investor "morality" education may not
have hindered the creation and enforcement of corporate norms so far,
particularly those relating to corporate governance. Ordinary Ameri-
cans, whether investors or not, do not need much education to under-
stand corporate violations of well-accepted social norms, so long as
statements, which solicit votes from shareholders, in "plain English" and in an easily com-
prehensible format. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-40018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,106-07 (1998) (requiring that the share-
holder proposal rules be written in a "plain English" question and answer format);
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39093, 62
Fed. Reg. 50,682 (proposing that the shareholder proposal rules be revised into a Question
& Answer, "plain English" format, resulting in rules that are easier to follow). As re-
quested by the House Committee on Commerce, the SEC also is investigating the norma-
tive issue of corporate charitable giving, that is, whether companies need to disclose in-
formation regarding their charitable contributions. See Securities & Exchange Comm'n,
Revised Invitation for Comments: Charitable Giving by Public Companies, (last modified
Nov. 24, 1997) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/othern/chgive.htm> (requesting public commen-
tary on corporate charitable giving).
54. See, e.g., HANSMANN, supra note 23, at 44-45, 57 (observing that shareholders are
well-suited to bear the risks of management opportunism because they can diversify their
investments).
55. See Fanto, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21-34) (arguing that cultural constraints
will make education a preferred United States solution to problems of individual saving
and investing).
56. In the educational partnership, federal and state agencies encourage individual
saving and investing behavior by publicizing its importance, by supporting investor educa-
tion in schools, and by facilitating the provision of investor education by private parties,
such as, financial firms, not-for-profit consumer groups, and self-regulatory organizations.
Federal law mandates the partnership. See Savings Are Vital to Everyone's Retirement
Act of 1997, 29 U.S.C.A §§ 1146-47 (West Supp. 1998) (amending ERISA and mandating
that the Department of Labor promote retirement savings by the public). It is certainly an
open question whether education can produce basic, successful investment performance
by most Americans and thus help avoid the enormous disparities in wealth due simply to
investment choices. I owe this observation to Professor Daniel Greenwood.
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someone brings the violations to their attention and suggests appropriate
action. In fact, on many critical social issues (e.g., environmental and ra-
cial issues) the "norm entrepreneurs" fulfill this role. 7 As is well-known,
many shareholder proposals for company proxy statements traditionally
come from such issue activists. 8
In corporate governance, certain institutional investors, such as the
public pension funds and firms giving guidance on proxy voting, 9 have
developed and enforced corporate governance norms among company
management for all the reasons that have been discussed ably in the gov-
ernance literature. They are the informed "consumers" whose activism
and monitoring may well benefit all investors with a free ride on their ef-
forts.6° In the past decade these investors clearly have transformed large
public corporations, bringing heightened scrutiny to, and developing best
practices for, executive and board behavior. Although debates continue
as to whether corporate governance activism has improved corporate
performance, which is another way of asking whether corporate govern.-
61ance really matters to firm success, there is no question in the world of
American, and even international, big business, as well as in the aca-
demic literature,62 that corporate governance has become the domain of
institutional investors and their specialized assistants.
Amid all of this norm creation and enforcement, the small investor has
been ignored. Norm entrepreneurs of large social issues simply aim to
57. The SEC acknowledges that a norm has been accepted widely in this country
when it compels companies to include proposals in their proxies dealing with that norm.
Cf. WILLIAM L. GARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 363-65 (7th ed. 1995) (noting SEC no-action letters advising against using
the ordinary business operations exception to proxy disclosure on controversial issues).
58. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,683; see
also Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Share-
holder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1044 (1998) (describing the
shareholder activist phenomenon and citing relevant articles on it).
59. Such organizations include Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. and the Inves-
tor Responsibility Research Center.
60. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 466-72 (1991) (discussing the ability of small
shareholders to rely on institutional investor activity); see generally Bernard S. Black,
Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV.
811 (1992) (addressing the benefits of active institutional investors).
61. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the
United States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
459,463 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) ("The overall level of shareholder activism is quite low.
A few institutions spend a trivial amount of money on overt activism.").
62. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS
M-1 to M-139 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997) (providing appendices listing
codes of best practice of corporate governance in numerous countries).
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galvanize this small investor along with other Americans to effect a de-
sired action, such as a product boycott. Specialists in corporate govern-
ance dismiss the small investor as irrelevant, explaining that he or she has
no time to spend on governance matters, and thus makes a rational deci-
sion to ignore such issues, and generally support management in an un-
thinking way.63 It is time, however, to consider moving beyond this
treatment of ordinary investors so that they may learn to care about and
to participate in the creation and enforcement of governance and other
norms.
IV. THE FUTURE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE EDUCATION?
While, in the best of circumstances, it may take time to convey success-
fully basic saving, investing, and anti-fraud education to the many ordi-
nary Americans in need of it, investor education should not stop with this
essential mission. Rather, it should be designed to train ordinary inves-
tors about corporate norms, make them consider their own views re-
garding these norms, and then instruct them in the possibilities of affect-
ing corporate behavior. The following discussion offers a few normative
and pragmatic arguments in support of this contention. It does not intend
to exaggerate the likelihood that this education will produce an immedi-
ate impact on investor or corporate behavior nor does it intend to ignore
the existing impediments to small shareholder activism. Even ordinary
investors educated to understand and judge the implications of corporate
behavior may still decide that the preferred, and perhaps only practical,
strategy is to build a well-diversified portfolio, adjusted for their own
risk-preferences, and, when dissatisfied with a given investment, to take
the traditional "Wall Street" walk. 64 They should not, however, be taught
that the only possibility available to them is to be a relatively passive
consumer of financial products and that investing must be limited to
purely financial considerations.
That investor education has a self-reflective, normative, and formative
side is apparent, even in the basic saving and investing education. This
63. See USEEM, supra note 24, at 18 (portraying the small shareholder in the takeover
situation: "Both sides calculated that most of the company's many small shareholders were
likely to remain loyal to management."); id. at 30 ("Smaller investors and firms have nei-
ther the inclination nor the capacity to move in these directions [i.e., more contacts with
company management].").
64. See BLAIR, supra note 16, at 35 ("This ability to sell out at any time is sometimes
called the 'Wall Street Walk' and, as noted above, is one way that shareholders can signal
their dissatisfaction with the way a company is being run.").
19981
Catholic University Law Review
education should bring an individual into the saving and investing "cul-
ture," which means that he or she should reflect on the financial goals,
both social (e.g., retirement) and personal (e.g., saving for specific pur-
poses), important to him or her, or to significant others, and should come
to understand his or her responsibility for meeting them. It should then
train the individual in the optimal ways that have emerged out of social
experience and social reflection, particularly in the disciplines of finance
and psychology, for achieving these goals through saving and investing.
Like every kind of education, investor education will be at once con-
straining and empowering: it constrains individuals by guiding them to
think about, and to do, saving and investing in particular ways, for par-
ticular purposes; it empowers them insofar as they benefit from the col-
lective social learning on performing well the important responsibilities
that this society has now placed on all individuals.65
The ultimate goal of investor education is to make an investor a re-
sponsible manager and owner of his or her property; investing educators
constantly remind people to remember that they are dealing with their
own assets. 6 Responsible ownership in investing means more than the
role of a consumer concentrating on the important, but narrow, goal of
designing an optimal portfolio for his or her purposes.67 While an owner-
ship perspective does not suggest that the investor cease to consider the
benefits that the investment brings specifically to him or her, it enlarges
the investor's vision to consider the purposes of firms, the organization
65. This observation is true of every social activity, as Stanley Fish (often) has ob-
served. See STANLEY FISH, PROFESSIONAL CORRECTNESS: LITERARY STUDIES AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 82 (1995) ("Each effort only makes sense in relation to the tradi-
tions, goals, obligatory routines, and normative procedures that comprise its history and
are the content of its distinctiveness; as tasks geared to different purposes, they call on en-
tirely different skills and set in motion different orders of attention."); see also MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 138 (Alan Sheridan
trans., Pantheon Books 1977) ("Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies,
'docile' bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility)
and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience).").
66. See Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Invest Wisely: Advice From Your Securities
Industry Regulators (last modified Dec. 19, 1997) <http://www.sec.gov/consumer/inws.
htm> ("Do not rush. Do the necessary background investigation on both the firm and the
sales representative."); Remarks of Chairman Arthur Levitt at the National Roundtable
on Saving and Investing (March 30, 1998) (available at
<http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch209.txt>) ("It's your money-Financial security
starts when you take personal responsibility for your financial well-being.").
67. See Don Phillips, Owner or Consumer? Open Letter to the SEC (visited May 2,
1997) <http://text.morningstar.net/cgi-bin/GetNery=MsOpEd/lettertosecl.html> (no
longer available at website, on file with The Catholic University Law Review) (letter by the
president of a mutual fund rating organization arguing against regulatory actions that ac-
cept and promote the view of ordinary investors as consumers).
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and governance structures for achieving these purposes, and the means
whereby the investor himself or herself can influence them. Since a large
organization, such as a public corporation-the final, although often me-
diated, investment of much of investors' funds-clearly does not exist to
serve the purposes of a single ordinary investor, the ownership perspec-
tive encourages the investor to understand the social issues implicated by
firms and their activities and the effects of these firms on many lives.
This view of responsible ownership of investment assets draws support
from a political vision, or at least accepts a relation between political
views and behavior concerning firm ownership. This relation should not
be surprising, because in the investment world, the idea of shareholder
democracy, with its own political resonance, has been used and espoused
at various times over the years.6 Scholars observe that firm governance
is closely related to a country's political traditions69 and that firm gov-
erning bodies in reality act in ways similar to political organizations in
their effort to balance competing firm interests and claimants. 70 A politi-
cal argument for an expanded "ownership" education for investors
would contend that a politically active citizenry needs to be actively in-
volved in managing investment property, particularly because the firms
that receive investments are so critical to providing the substructure for
the political activity in the first place.71  Just as responsible investing
should reinforce the political component, a limited view of it could pro-
mote political passivity.72 Without dramatizing the issue, there are politi-
68. See generally Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social
Responsibility: The Need to Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 33, 79 (1997) ("As the 'owners' of the corporate enterprise, the share-
holders deserve a meaningful role in the corporate decision-making process.") (footnote
omitted) (citing Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680-81 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 403 (1972)).
69. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 19-49 (1994) (discussing the political para-
digm of corporate ownership).
70. See Blair & Stout, supra note 24 ("[O]ur theory [the "team production model"]
points to the fundamentally political nature of the corporation.") (footnote omitted).
71. See Lazaroff, supra note 68, at 81 (arguing that corporate activity may generate
more social and economic reform than government action). This statement does not mean
to suggest that culture is determined by the "more essential" economic activities in society.
See FREDRIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY
SYMBOLIC ACT 32, 35-36 (1981) (identifying the economic infrastructure as a part of an
"entire system of relationships" among various bases of "superstructures," that is, culture,
ideology, the legal system, and the state).
72. See Greenwood, supra note 12, at 1098-1104 (arguing that a limited view results in
shareholders that value only those actions that increase stock price, even when they con-
flict with traditional societal norms); cf AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 44
(1987) ("[A] democratic state must aid children in developing the capacity to understand
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cal and ideological implications in failing to instruct people about the
consequences of their ownership of property and in encouraging them to
view such ownership in a limited way.73
The normative justification should have an individual, as well as a so-
cial or "political" component, although the political and individual com-
ponents are closely interrelated. This justification would propose that,
where feasible, an individual should not be limited to a specific role, par-
ticularly a passive one, in a given activity, but should be made aware of
all of the possibilities of expression, influence, and ability to contribute
that are available in the activity. This potential is a positive human good
and should be facilitated and promoted.74 Investor education about sav-
ing and investing is individually empowering because it helps individuals
understand and undertake the diverse forms of human expression and
control that these activities make possible.75 Yet limiting investor educa-
tion to these subjects would harmfully cut off the possibilities of other
kinds of individual activity and expression in investing. Such limitations
would reify individuals in roles by causing them to think of themselves as
limited to certain activities (e.g., selecting the optimal portfolio) and by
significantly discouraging them from engaging in others.76
and to evaluate competing conceptions of the good life and the good society.").
73. For a related argument, see Gregory S. Alexander, Pensions and Passivity, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 112-13 (1993) (arguing that the passivity encouraged by
the modern pension system "diminishes the degree of personal responsibility that classical
liberal ownership required all individual owners to take. At the same time, despite its
group-like character, the corporate pension system, unlike classical socialism, contains no
features that allow, let alone guarantee, democratic participation by the group.") (footnote
omitted).
74. Cf. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 35
(1984)
Its [the doctrine of modernism] specific social expression is the belief that no in-
stitutional order and no imaginative vision of the varieties of possible and desir-
able human association can fully exhaust the types of practical or passionate hu-
man connection that we may have good reason to desire and a good chance to
establish.
Id.
75. As an aside, the empirical evidence on investor education suggests that ordinary
investors prefer to control their property and investment decision making. See Arthur B.
Kennickell et al., Saving and Financial Planning: Some Findings From a Focus Group, 8
FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 1, 4 (1997) (noting that the focus group emphasizes "self-
control" in saving and financial planning).
76. Cf JAMESON, supra note 71, at 63. Jameson explains that reification
is a complex [dynamic] in which the traditional or "natural" ... unities, social
forms, human relations, cultural events, even religious systems, are systematically
broken up in order to be reconstructed more efficiently, in the form of new post-
natural processes or mechanisms; but in which, at the same time, these now iso-
lated broken bits and pieces of the older unities acquire a certain autonomy of
their own, a semi-autonomous coherence.
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Pragmatic concerns about improving corporate behavior add support
to these normative justifications for additional and broader investor edu-
cation that focus more on benefits to the individual investor. It is impor-
tant to remember that, despite the current focus on institutional inves-
tors, ordinary investors have not disappeared even from the direct
investment world; institutional investors own only approximately 47% of
the equity in this country, and these investors generally are acting for77
smaller investors. In other words, behind all the institutional investor
activity stands the ordinary person who increasingly puts funds in a mu-
tual fund, pension fund, or insurance annuity. While it is commonplace
to mention securities market transformations due to the enormous
changes in computer technology," one important consequence is that the
technology may promote more direct, as opposed to intermediated, in-
vesting by individual investors, who together would have significant vot-
ing power in many corporations.79
A large, untrained group of owners eventually may have a negative
Id. Reification certainly is not due just to mental constraints. People often do not make
efforts to engage in activities because the activities either expressly are prohibited to them
or the access to them is so restricted as to make general involvement impossible. Yet such
prohibitions and restrictions are at least partly kept in force by ideological views that en-
courage some people to think that they are not "worthy" or competent to participate in a
particular activity. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, LA
REPRODUCTION: tLtMENTS POUR UNE THitORIE DU SYSTItME D'ENSEIGNEMENT
(1970).
77. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD, 1 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT:
PATTERNS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT AND CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES:
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EQUITY HOLDINGS 7 (1997) (stating that recent growth in insti-
tutional investors' share of equity holdings has remained stable after rapid growth during
the 1980s).
78. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 1195 (arguing that the Internet will revolutionize
securities regulation).
79. See id. at 1197 & n.9 (observing that "[oJn the longer-term horizon, there is even
the visionary possibility that the Internet can be used to pass through voting rights in secu-
rities held by pension and mutual funds to the fund's own owners or beneficiaries-a pos-
sibility that carries with it profoundly destabilizing implications for institutional inves-
tors") (footnotes omitted); Howard M. Friedman, Proxy Solicitations and the Cyberspace
Revolution, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1997, at 9, 11-12 (observing that "[s]ome companies have be-
gun to experiment with holding their annual meetings [on-line]," and noting that, "[t]he
Internet may overtake structural reform as the tool of corporate democratization in the
21st century"); John C. Wilcox, Electronic Communication and Proxy Voting: The Gov-
ernance Implications of Shareholders in Cyberspace, INSIGHTS, Mar. 1997, at 8, 11 (dis-
cussing company communications with investors through new electronic media and won-
dering whether "pass-through voting" for investors in pension funds and mutual funds will
develop). Indeed, "pass-through" voting has developed within both defined contribution
and defined benefit pension plans. See generally Donald J. Myers & Michael B. Richman,
Pass- Through of Proxy and Tender Decisions-New Guidance from the Nationsbank Case,
PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA) (Apr. 1, 1998), available in LEXIS, Labor Library,
BNAPEN File (describing developments in pass-through voting in retirement plans).
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impact on corporate behavior. If ordinary investors figure, even more
importantly than they do now, directly in the capital of public corpora-
tions and if they are not trained in corporate morality, there ultimately
could be adverse consequences for the enforcement of corporate, and
particularly corporate governance, norms. The accepted wisdom is that
individual investors generally follow, and will continue to follow, invest-
ment managers, ° which makes sense if they have no morality education.
They have little time available even for the financial aspects of their in-
vestments and have never been encouraged to consider a possible corpo-
rate governance role. Accordingly, it is reasonable for them to support
management, with whom they are familiar, over outside challengers on
nearly every issue. Indeed, the potential negative impact from investor
passivity applies especially to behavior of financial intermediaries, such
as mutual funds, through which many ordinary people invest.81
As a pragmatic matter it makes sense for the norm entrepreneurs, who
have been sometimes successful in policing corporate behavior, to recog-
nize the benefits from the presence of other educated, but ordinary, in-
vestors. There need be, in fact, no stark division between institutional
and retail investors on normative issues, even if obvious differences exist
in investing abilities and professional occupations. In helping to monitor
corporate and corporate agent behavior, whether on corporate govern-
ance or other matters, activist institutions may be more successful in
norm enforcement if they can draw support from ordinary investors who
are direct investors or the beneficiaries of institutional funds. That is,
their complaints about corporate misbehavior will have more force,
whether through the corporate ballot box or through outside public pres-
sure, if their views reach beyond other institutional investors to touch the
large group of traditionally passive individual investors. Having ordinary
investors on their side may also help institutional investors deflect criti-
cisms from company management or from politicians that they are the
new elites wielding too much financial power without accountability.
This leads to the scope of morality education and its providers. Be-
cause this topic is potentially a large one, I offer here only a few observa-
tions. As a preliminary solution, morality education could come from
the very norm entrepreneurs who have been successful in enforcing cor-
porate norms, particularly in corporate governance. Concerned parties
such as norm entrepreneurs, will always mobilize to convey their mes-
80. See Wilcox, supra note 79, at 12.
81. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1998 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 1
(38th ed. 1998) (observing that the total assets in mutual funds grew from $1.07 trillion in
1990 to $4.5 trillion in 1997).
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sage to the public when startling examples of corporate abuse appear in
their domain. Because corporate governance services for institutional
investors have prepared and standardized information about corporate
governance norms, they could design presentations and formats for ordi-
nary investors without much trouble." Computer technology lowers the
costs of preparing and communicating this education, as it does for basic
investor education." Since information on governance norms and their
violations thus can be communicated easily to ordinary investors, as it is
now among institutional investors, individual investors need only a con-
ceptual framework on governance norms so that they can make sense of,
and act on, the disclosed information.
Investors need more systematic and extensive morality education than
what these norm entrepreneurs can offer. This education would intersect
with general economic education. Its goal would be to take a "larger"
view of business activity and to see, realistically, the possibilities of indi-
vidual and collective action therein. Investors should learn about the
role of firms in the economy, the advantages that come from complex
business organizational structures, and the accepted purposes and goals
of corporate and other business activity.5 The education would include
discussion and debate about these purposes and about the interaction be-
tween business goals and other social ends, such as human welfare issues.
Investors would have to receive instruction about the power and decision
82. One thinks, for example, of Institutional Shareholder Service, Inc.'s (ISS) infor-
mation and instructions on proxy voting throughout the world, a service that is available in
computerized form. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., Proxy Record (visited
Aug. 25, 1998) <http://www.cda.com/iss/prxyrcrd.html> (describing the ISS's proxy soft-
ware). The obvious question is whether ISS would find it profitable to provide a similar
kind of service for small investors. An organization like the American Association of In-
dividual Investors might also design appropriate materials.
83. Institutional investors could reach retail investors through Web-sites. In fact, an
enterprising small investor can learn much about corporate governance norms through
existing Web-sites of institutional investors and other groups. See, e.g., Corporate Gov-
ernance (visited Aug. 26, 1998) <http://www.CORPGOV.NET> (independent net site with
many corporate governance links): Counsel of Institutional Investors (visited Aug. 25,
1998) <http://www.ciicentral.com> (site of the Council of Institutional Investors); LENS
The Active Investment Alternative (visited Aug. 25, 1998) <http://www.lens-inc.com> (site
of fund run by noted activists Robert Monks and Nell Minow); Welcome to CalPERS On-
line (visited Aug. 25, 1998) <http://www.calpers.ca.gov> (site of the California Public Em-
ployees' Retirement System).
84. See Wilcox, supra note 79, at 11 (referring to the issue of mobilization that is oc-
curring among institutional investors through Web-sites).
85. As noted above, current investor education materials have little such information.
See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 48, at 28-29, available at
<http://www.nyse.com/public/educate/6a/6a5/6a5.htm> (visited Aug. 25, 1998) (focusing on
macro-economic and financial education).
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making structure within a corporation to understand who manages it and
why, what is the function of corporate officers and board members, and
what are the prevalent views about their appropriate behavior. The edu-
cation naturally would lead to an explanation of how ordinary investors
can affect corporate decision making and enforce behavior. Although, as
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means pointed out long ago, securities are a
special kind of property without the control rights traditionally associ-
ated with ownership,86 investors should still be instructed on available
means of control, even if the means are not extensive and their exercise
does not often succeed.
Families and schools have an important role in conveying basic educa-
tion about saving and investing." Although families will develop more
expertise on saving and investing because these activities are a part of
everyday life, they may have a more difficult time conducting the moral-
ity education described above, other than by fulfilling their important
role of inculcating in the young the foundations of morality. 8 By con-
trast, high schools are better positioned to provide this general economic
and business education and an introduction to the social debates associ-
ated with them.89 Financial regulators must also conduct this education.
Just as they have come to recognize the importance of investor educa-
86. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 3-10 (1991).
87. See Fanto, supra note 1, (manuscript at 51-58) (discussing the actions families and
schools can take in savings and investing education).
88. See Richard H. Thaler & Hersh M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control,
in RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS 77, 85 (1991) ("The best predic-
tors of which individuals will fall into which groups [better versus worse savers] are proba-
bly related to family background, since the family is the most likely place for the individual
to learn (or not learn) the rules and norms necessary to overcome the self-control prob-
lems.") (footnote omitted).
89. Professor Langevoort suggested during the symposium that, because schools do
not now function well in conveying basic knowledge to students, it is inappropriate to im-
pose on them another educational task. This criticism applies equally to placing any kind
of investor education responsibility on the schools. Yet the question whether schools are
now functioning properly is at least partly distinct from the question whether they are well
situated (because they reach individuals early in life) to conduct morality education. Cf,
GUTMANN supra note 72, at 70 (observing that the present problem with schools is not an
adequate argument against the importance of schools in morality education). In fact, the
available empirical evidence suggests that high school investor education has positively
affected students' later saving and investing behavior. See B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM ET
AL., EDUCATION AND SAVING: THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF HIGH SCHOOL
FINANCIAL CURRICULUM MANDATES 3 (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6085, July 1997). If education can have this effect in present circumstances, why
should such school training not enjoy similar success with morality education?
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tion,9° they have to move beyond its financial focus, which serves to keep
investors from thinking about anything other than their own personal
portfolio. Once the regulators have adequately addressed basic saving
and investing education-that is, by making individuals recognize the
importance of having an optimal personal portfolio-they must remind
investors of the larger moral and social issues that come with business
operation and ownership."
V. CONCLUSION
Investor education will receive much worldwide attention and activity
in the coming decades92 as more individuals are given responsibility for
their saving and investing. Because of this responsibility, individual in-
vestors need an optimal investment return to meet their financial goals,
particularly in retirement. While the main focus of educational efforts
will, and should be, on saving, investing, and preventing investment
fraud, and while the education must be done so that investors do not for-
get this focus, 93 it must eventually extend to instruction on "larger" firm
issues. If individuals are to be responsible stewards of their investment
property, they should understand the purposes of business firms, their
governance, and the norms that are appropriate for firms and firm
agents, as well as the need for changes in normative behavior to ensure
that firms function better in accordance with these purposes. Further-
more, this instruction should enable ordinary investors to read disclo-
sures to understand the norms a firm or its agents are following (and/or
90. See Fanto, supra note 1, (manuscript at 71-79) (referring to the educational efforts
of the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration and federal bank regulators).
91. Just as there may be difficulties in having financial regulators espouse any given
investment strategy, such regulators must reflect before advocating any given business for
firms, other than shareholder value. Yet there is no reason why regulators could not iden-
tify competing purposes and urge investors to be active, as time permits, in supporting the
ones they favor. I do not mean to suggest that basic saving and investing education is not
an ongoing process for most ordinary investors and a target of oversight for financial
regulators. Once, however, the regulators have generally promoted this basic education,
they should then encourage the development of morality education.
92. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Comm'n, First-Ever Hemisphere-Wide Investor
Education Campaign Planned; Campaign will promote financial literacy, economic growth
(Dec. 15, 1997) available at <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/97-111.txt> (discussing inves-
tor education campaigns throughout Latin America and Canada).
93. Some participants in the symposium were concerned that morality education
would distract investors from the basics of investing. Similarly, some did not want finan-
cial regulators, like the SEC, to focus on corporate morality, because it would distract the
regulators from overseeing securities markets. While these are valid concerns, it seems to
me ultimately harmful, for the reasons stated above, to restrict retail investing to purely
financial concerns.
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the advice provided by norm entrepreneurs) and to take action to en-
force, or at least promote, the behavior that they personally support.
This education will counteract the representation that the individual
investor is simply a provider of capital, active insofar as he or she at-
tempts to maximize his or her own investment return, but passive re-
garding anything that does not touch on this exclusive focus, a rationale
that is used to explain his or her indifference to corporate governance
and a representation that actually contributes to such passivity and im-
pedes other kinds of investor action. If firms are understood as more
than mere instruments of shareholder profit and as complex, quasi-
political organizations serving multiple contending and contentious con-
stituencies, the retail investor, who provides, directly or indirectly, much
firm capital, must be brought back into the picture, particularly regarding
the creation and enforcement of corporate governance and other norms.
It is important that these investors learn to express their voice or voices,
and investor morality education is necessary to this expression.
Again, I emphasize that this education may lead neither to more
shareholder democracy nor to a radical transformation in investor or
corporate behavior. Despite their understanding of norms of corporate
behavior, ordinary investors may decide to spend the little time that they
have available on maximizing their portfolio value to satisfy their own
personal financial preferences. The familiar "structural" problems of
shareholder action-the difficulty of acting collectively and the little
value of any one shareholder voice in a large organization-remain. Yet
if people are encouraged to understand investing in a broader context
that, despite its social framework, has direct relevance to their own lives,
they may well take an interest and participate in norm enforcement, even
if only in the limited way that their time and efforts permit. 94 It is inap-
propriate, both for normative and pragmatic reasons, to keep individual
investing within a restricted sphere, now that it is part of everyday life.
94. After all, individuals do vote in political elections, even though similar collective
action problems exist in that context. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 21, at 136.
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